Tutorial � Rosen, post-Kantian VII � Hegel, Nietzsche, Kant

Greg Detre

26/2/01

universal law of nature

flexibility of duty

Golden Rule??? insufficient for Christianity, SotM

hypothetical/categorical��� hypothetical can be prescriptive too

can have reasons, but can't act as rational justification

CI = a reason of a special kind, self-evidently rational

can't be justified by further principles

rational being must acknowledge on pain of a kind of self-contradiction

Nietzsche distinction between reason vs egalitarianism

ocnneciton between them: prejudices of philosophers

Kantianism as paradigmatic of slave morality

������ GS � Shadow of Buddha, God�s shadow remains over Europe

relevant to science + reason, <= theological doctrines

even if you had reason, you still wouldn't have capacity to act as purely rational wills, i.e. to act on the basis of our reason

Kant:

1. to act morally means/requires that we act for a moral reason
2. only those reasons are moral that are not not motivated by non-autonomous desires

Nietzsche rejects (2) � morality is \ not possible

Kantian circle: requires freedom for morality, assumes morality \ freedom

herd morality = weakeing the strong

weak invoke pure abstract will

to get the strong to turn their will on themselves

there is no free moral will

but there is an inner will (Gulliver binding himself) from contending WTPs + drives

their WTP plays tricks on the strong

the weak then do dominate the strong

strength + WTP = ethical value � OM

consider the Kantian will

equalising differences = a violation

bifurcation in will � autonomous/heteronomous will

mysterious but pure autonomy

we know there�s freedom because we supposedly can't help believing it

Hegel � CI as empty + formal

is Kant�s duty flexible + personal??? no

duty = universal to all, too existentialist

only differs if our circumstances are different, but not from personalities

so there must be a determinate content for the human reason within the CI? maybe

Kaufmann � not a logical contradiction

contradiction in the conception, vs in willing

e.g. indolent lotus-eaters, inconsistent with your understanding of self + capacities for self-development

conception = more logical, e.g. promise-breaking

Hegel + self-consciousness

reading for next tute�

Questions

derivation of CI

Groundwork (Paton, �) � Development of Kant�s view of ethics � Keith Ward

what�s this about Nietzsche saying there�s no free moral will???

so what freedom do we have in Nietzsche???

how is he defining weak in order to stop the sly from being �strong� in a way???